Legal Briefs

MCA Participations and Securities Law: Recognizing and Managing a Looming Threat

December 11, 2018
Article by:

Reprinted with permission from: Pepper Hamilton LLP
Authors: Gregory J. Nowak and Mark T. Dabertin

Pepper Hamilton

Due to the high volume of relevant judicial decisions issued by New York courts over the past two years, the risk that enforceability of a merchant cash advance (MCA) contract1 might be successfully challenged as a disguised usurious loan has received ample attention in law firm white papers and published legal articles, including articles by Pepper Hamilton attorneys.2 Avoiding this risk of “loan re-characterization” is essential if the MCA industry is to achieve wider acceptance as a source of small business financing. But another risk—which we believe is largely unrecognized—could significantly throttle further expansion of MCA financing. This risk is that the funding structures MCA providers rely on to generate funding from third-party investors could be found to involve the issuance of unregistered securities. Unless an exception is available, that would be unlawful and could result in fines, penalties, defense costs and even rescission of the entire transaction, with the “issuer” being required to return investor capital.

Many MCA providers raise new funding by offering “participation interests” in their MCA contracts to third-party investors. These are usually structured in one of two ways. Under a “true participation,” the participant acquires the right to receive payments, and a resulting return on the participant’s investment, exclusively from the MCA provider. To this end, the participant receives no rights to enforce, nor any direct interest in, the underlying MCA contracts. Alternatively, the participation agreement may be structured so as to make each investor a pro rata “co-funder” of the underlying MCA contracts in an agreed-upon percentage (the “participation share”). Under this structure, the MCA provider’s contract with the merchant typically acknowledges the possible existence of “co-funders” in general terms, and does not require the merchant to ratify and accept named co-funders as they come into being. This add-on is usually accomplished through a novation to the MCA contract.

Under either of the above-described participation structures, the nature of the participant’s investment is purely passive, with no possibility for active involvement in the underlying MCA relationships. In fact, the participation agreement likely expressly prohibits such interference. The passive nature of a participant’s investment matters, because the presence of passivity, and the resulting reliance on the efforts of another party (i.e., the party offering the investment) to realize a profitable return, is a key factor for purposes of determining whether a security exists under the federal securities laws.

In SEC v. WJ Howey Co.,3> the U.S. Supreme Court established the following four-factor test for identifying the existence of a security: (1) an investment, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with a reasonable expectation of profits, (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. The facts of Howey concerned investments in an orange grove operation, where the investors were entirely dependent on the efforts of the orange grove manager/promoter to maintain the trees that the investor had invested in. In the case of an MCA participation structured as described above, all four Howey factors are arguably present. An investment is made with the expectation of realizing a profit. In addition, as discussed above, because that investment is passive in nature, its success hinges on the efforts of the MCA provider. Finally, at least one court has opined that the existence of common enterprise is inherent to any participation relationship.4

The Howey test, which seeks to identify the presence of an “investment contract,” is not the sole means for evaluating whether an investment constitutes a security. In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the expansive definition of the term “security” under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Security Exchange Act of 1934 extends to other forms of “notes” besides investment contracts.5 In determining whether the “demand notes” at issue in Reves constituted a security, the court applied what is commonly known as the “close resemblance” test. Under this test, if the note in question bears a close resemblance to a type of note that has been judicially recognized as not involving a security, that note likewise will not be considered a security. For example, on its face, an MCA contract closely resembles “a short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets.”6 However, in an MCA contract, the purchased future receivables provide the source of repayment of the advanced funds, as opposed to providing security for a lien.

This distinction is important. because in an MCA, the receivables do not yet exist, so there is nothing to lien. Rather, the MCA involves receivables to be created, presumably using the proceeds of the MCA to do so. Properly drafted MCAs sidestep all “note-like” characteristics, and make it clear that the MCA is a contract to purchase an asset (i.e., receivables) that are yet to be created. There is no sum certain for repayment – unlike a note, if the receivables turn out to be bad, the MCA provider has no recourse back to the merchant that created them. The receivables are not security for a loan; rather, the receivables are the property being forward purchased. MCAs are different in kind and extent from loans.

Notwithstanding the Howey test, and as noted above, it is possible to argue persuasively that an instrument that appears to be a security instead describes the terms of an individually negotiated contractual agreement. In this regard, in Marine Bank v. Weaver,7 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a contract between a bank and a married couple that called for the latter to pledge a certificate of deposit as security for a loan between the bank and an unrelated corporate borrower in exchange for the opportunity to share in the latter’s future profits did not involve a security. In doing so, the court distinguished the note in question from investments that fall within the “ordinary concept of a security. . . [which are offered] to a number of potential investors.”8 In contrast, the Court in Marine Bank found that the contested note created “a unique agreement [that was] negotiated one-on-one by the parties” and was therefore, “not a security.”9

In the absence of an applicable statutory exemption, the public offering of unregistered securities constitutes a criminal violation of the federal securities laws. Because securities can generally only be sold to the public by a registered broker-dealer, people who engage in selling such securities, as well as their related corporate actors, may be subject to monetary penalties for the resulting violations of law. An improperly structured MCA participation presents the risks that: (i) sales of participations made under the flawed structure could be declared void and subject to rescission; and (ii) both the MCA provider and its primary individual actors could be subject to criminal prosecution and resulting monetary penalties. In the remainder of this article, we discuss ways for effectively mitigating these risks.

Structuring the MCA participation so as to make each participant not merely a “co-funder” in name, but an actual party to each underlying MCA contract by means of a contract novation signed by the merchant and naming the individual participants, would arguably eliminate any risk that the structure might be deemed to involve the unlawful issuance of securities. Under this structure, each participant, at least in theory, could enforce the MCA contracts directly against the applicable merchants, without having to rely on the MCA provider. The main flaw with this option is that the MCA participation agreement necessarily prohibits such independent actions by the participant, because those actions could directly conflict with the economic interests of either or both the MCA provider or additional participants. Hence, any actual ability of the participant to be actively engaged in the underlying merchant relationships will be missing. As the number of participants increases to more than a handful, this structure – requiring as it does that the merchant ratify and accept every new participant as each participant is added, is unwieldy and becomes infeasible to administer.

One could also argue that including a requirement in the MCA participation agreements that the participant must evaluate independently the quality of each MCA contract before the purchase of the participation share precludes the existence of a common enterprise. However, unless each participant has its own series of MCAs, this distinction is unlikely to be of significance, because all participants are participating in the same MCA. Also, notwithstanding the obligation to conduct independent reviews, the MCA participant must still rely on the MCA provider to source qualified merchants. In addition, as noted above, the investor also must depend on the MCA provider’s success in collecting payments from merchants, which will determine whether a profitable return is achieved. Finally, where a pool of investors all share in the risks and benefits of a particular business enterprise (known in securities law as “horizontal commonality”), the resulting presumption of a common enterprise is extremely difficult to disprove.

In view of the above, we suggest that the best way to manage the risk that the participation structure might be viewed as involving the unauthorized issuance of securities is to embrace the substance, if not the precise letter, of the federal securities laws. Specifically, by structuring the participation in a manner that complies with the safe harbor from the requirement to register securities described in Section 506 of the SEC rules under the Securities Act of 1933. This entails: (i) only selling participations to accredited investors; (ii) describing the applicable risks (i.e., the risk factors) and potential conflicts of interest in an addendum to the participation agreement; (iii) making sure that all sales of participants are made on a one-to-one basis, with no general solicitation or marketing; and (iv) advising participants that the resale of their participation share may be subject to a one-year minimum holding period. (Of course, if the MCA pays off before the one year period and extinguishes the MCA, that is not an issue under this rule.)

We caution that the securities laws are both difficult to navigate and prone to divergent interpretations. The consequences of misinterpretation can be severe and could result in the rescission of existing participations and monetary penalties. Hence, this is not a DIY proposition.

Pepper Points

  • The risk that an MCA participation structure could be found by a regulator or court to constitute the unlawful issuance of securities is under appreciated, and has serious consequences that could throttle the availability and growth of MCA financing.

  • Although legal arguments can be made in support of the position that the most commonly used MCA participation structures do not involve the unlawful issuance of unregistered securities, none of those arguments is sufficiently persuasive to preclude the need for additional risk mitigation efforts.

  • Mitigation plans for managing the risk that a given MCA participation structure involves should incorporate complying with the substance, and the precise letter, of the federal securities laws.

The federal securities laws are difficult to navigate and prone to divergent interpretations. The consequences of misinterpretation are severe and could include the rescission of existing participations and assessments of monetary penalties, including against individual actors.

Endnotes

1 An MCA is a business financing option that involves the advance of funds to a merchant, typically to assist the merchant in managing its short-term cash flow needs, in exchange for the sale of a specified percentage of the merchant’s future receivables at a sizeable discount. It is a relatively new offshoot of “factoring,” which likewise involves the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount in exchange for an advance of funds to a business, with the primary difference being that the receivables in the case of MCA financing are not yet extant. An MCA contract might be deemed a disguised usurious loan for many reasons, including the inclusion of a set term within which the advance must be repaid in full to avoid default. The most critical factor in this regard is whether the MCA provider is looking to the purchased receivables for repayment, or to the merchant itself or its individual owner(s); e.g., in the form of a financial guarantee given by the owner(s).

2 For a broader discussion of MCA financing, and the risk of re-characterization as a usurious loan, see: https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/recent-litigation-illustrates-why-merchant-cash-advances-are-not-loans-2017-04-20/.

3 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

4 Provident National Bank v. Frankfort Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (By its “very nature” any participation involves a common enterprise.).

5 494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990) (“The demand notes here may well not be ‘investment contracts,’ but that does not mean they are ‘notes.’ To hold that a ‘note’ is not a ‘security’ unless it meets a test designed for an entirely different variety of instrument ‘would make the Acts’ enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous’ Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 692, and would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to regulate the entire body of instruments sold as investments, see supra at 60-62”.).

6 Id. at 65.

7 455 U.S. 551 (1982).

8 Id. at 552.

9 Id.at 560. In Vorrius v. Harvey, 570 F. Supp. 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court followed Marine Bank in finding that a contested loan participation agreement involved an individually negotiated contract versus a security. A key factor in that case, however, was the existence of a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme apart from the federal securities laws in the form of banking laws and regulations, which made application of the former unnecessary for purposes of protecting the interest of investors. No such alternative regulatory scheme exists in the case of the MCA industry, which is generally unregulated.

The material in this publication was created as of the date set forth above and is based on laws, court decisions, administrative rulings and congressional materials that existed at that time, and should not be construed as legal advice or legal opinions on specific facts. The information in this publication is not intended to create, and the transmission and receipt of it does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship.

1st Global Capital Consents With SEC

November 28, 2018
Article by:

Subject to approval in two courts, 1 Global Capital LLC (aka 1st Global Capital) has confirmed it will consent with the SEC to be permanently enjoined and restrained from violating securities laws. The papers were submitted to the Court yesterday.

Though the terms include 1st Global Capital’s California counterpart, 1 West Capital, LLC, there is no connection to the separate securities charges pending against company founder and former CEO Carl Ruderman. Ruderman is seeking to dismiss those charges. According to court records, his reply to the SEC’s opposition is due this Friday.

SEC Scoffs at 1st Global Capital’s Attempt to Dismiss Securities Complaint

November 17, 2018
Article by:

The SEC is not impressed with 1st Global Capital’s attempt to dismiss the charges it stands accused of. Yesterday, the SEC filed opposition papers, writing “Having defrauded thousands of investors out of almost $300 million, Defendant Carl Ruderman now asks the Court to let him escape the consequences of his actions by dismissing the Amended Complaint against him based on a series of inaccurate and incomplete facts, incorrect legal standards, and infirm legal arguments.”

1st Global and Ruderman (who was the company’s owner and CEO), argued that the SEC does not have subject matter jurisdiction and that the notes between 1st Global and investors were not securities.

“Ruderman misstates the standards for evaluating whether a note is a security, and does not even bother to address the separate test for determining whether an investment qualifies as an investment contract,” the SEC claims. “The investment 1 Global offered and sold to investors was a security.”

Parallel to the SEC case, bankruptcy proceedings are continuing to move forward as well.

There has been no word on criminal charges since 1st Global revealed it was being investigated by the US attorney’s office in July.

The SEC’s opposition to 1st Global’s motion to dismiss can be downloaded here.

“Out Of State” MCA Funder Not Precluded From Entering COJs in New York, Court Rules

October 18, 2018
Article by:

In May 2017, Funding Metrics (FM), a small business funding provider, entered a signed Confession of Judgment (COJ) in Westchester County, NY against a California-based customer. The Court issued a judgment a mere five days later.

That should have been the end of it, but on July 26th, the customer hired law firm White & Williams to challenge the judgment’s validity on the basis that New York Business Corporations Law § 1314 limits the circumstances in which a non-resident corporation may bring an action or special proceeding against another non-resident corporation. Neither FM nor the customer were based in New York nor had any connections to New York whatsoever, they alleged, which precludes such a judgment from being entered there. But it’s doubly bad, defendants argued, because the judgment by confession statute in New York is unconstitutional as it waives the defendants’ due process rights.

The Honorable Terry Jane Ruderman was unmoved by the arguments, pointing out that not only was FM registered to do business in New York and claimed to have an office there but that defendants incorrectly relied on § 1314 because a Confession of judgment is not an action, nor a special proceeding.

[…]That statute does not preclude the judgment entered here, entered by confession of judgment. By such a document, a person “agree[s] to the entry of judgment upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event” (see Black’s Law Dictionary [10th ed. 2014]), giving the holder a remedy that does not require proof of the nature of the transaction or allow for interposing defenses (see Soler v_Klimova, 5 AD3d 294 [1st Dept 2004]). Therefore, in entering the judgment, the court does not inquire into the underlying transaction, including with regard to such matters as the home state of the corporate plaintiff.

Moreover, while the Business Corporations Law § 1314 applies to “maintaining actions or special proceedings,” the statute providing for judgments by confession does not require commencement of an action; it clearly states that “a judgment by confession may be entered, without an action, … upon an affidavit executed by the defendant” ( CPLR 3218 [emphasis added]).

Defendants’ constitutionality argument was rejected as “meritless” and all of their other arguments not discussed in the order were explicitly rejected.

You can download the decision here.

The case # is 57737/2017 in Westchester County in the New York Supreme Court. The law firm representing plaintiff Funding Metrics was Stein Adler Dabah & Zelkowitz.

ISO Pretending to be Funder May Be Sent to Jail

October 14, 2018
Article by:

A New York Supreme Court judge ordered on Thursday that Long Island-based ISO JTT Funding either be fined or sent to prison if it does not comply with a previous restraining order obtained by NYC-based funder Accel Capital.

JTT Funding Order

Accel alleges that JTT funding has been impersonating it through correspondence and on contracts, a scheme that was outed when merchants claimed they had been duped into sending thousands of dollars upfront to JTT (disguised as Accel) to obtain a loan yet never received one. Accel responded by suing JTT and obtained a restraining order on default when the defendant failed to respond.

According to the Financial Times, JTT Funding is owned by Queens-born mixed martial arts fighter Jim “The Tyrant” Boudourakis. In his October 2017 interview with the publication, Boudourakis said, “There was a learning curve, going from being a fighter to a salesman. But I’m good with people.” FT also reported that his company had 18 full-time salespeople and was funding $4 – $5 million per month.

In an unrelated suit, JTT Funding is accused of forging a confession of judgment.

The Accel Capital suit can be found in the New York Supreme Court under Index Number: 153447/2018

Capital Stack Hit With Class Action Lawsuit

October 10, 2018
Article by:

A class action lawsuit brought by former employees of Capital Stack, LLC was filed in federal court on Tuesday for damages resulting from alleged labor law violations. David Rubin, Brian Stulman, eProdigy ACH, LLC, and eProdigy Operations, LLC are also among the named defendants. Capital Stack is a merchant cash advance company based in New York.

The 22-page complaint lays out seven claims including failure to pay the minimum wage required by New York Labor Law.

The suit can be downloaded here.

The case is 1:18-cv-09230 in New York Southern District Court.

Renaud Laplanche Barred From the Securities Industry

September 28, 2018
Article by:
Renaud Laplanche, 1 month before he resigned from LendingClub at the LendIt USA 2016 conference in San Francisco, California, USA on April 11, 2016. (photo by Gabe Palacio)
Renaud Laplanche, 1 month before he resigned from LendingClub at the LendIt USA 2016 conference in San Francisco, California, USA on April 11, 2016. (photo by Gabe Palacio)

The SEC announced today that it charged LendingClub Asset Management, formerly known as LendingClub Advisors LLC (LCA), and its former president and co-founder Renaud Laplanche, with fraud – for improperly using fund money to benefit LendingClub Corporation, LCA’s parent company. LCA, Laplanche and Carrie Dolan, LCA’s former CFO, also were charged with improperly adjusting fund returns.

LCA, Laplanche and Dolan have agreed to settle the SEC’s charges against them and will pay penalties of $4 million, $200,000, and $65,000, respectively. The SEC also barred Laplanche from the securities industry for three years. LCA, Laplanche, and Dolan agreed to the entry of the SEC’s order without admitting or denying the agency’s findings.

This follows Laplanche’s ouster from LendingClub in May 2016 amid revelations of falsified loan records and conflicts of interest under Laplanche’s leadership. He is now the CEO of Upgrade, a San Francisco-based online lender, and he has been hailed recently for his resilience for making such a quick comeback.

A representative from Upgrade provided deBanked with a statement from Laplanche:

“I am pleased to have worked out a settlement with the SEC to put to rest any issues related to compliance lapses that might have occurred under my watch at Lending Club. Consistent with SEC policy, I have agreed not to admit nor deny the specific narrative of the events contained in the settlement order.  I would like, however, to provide additional context:

1. To the extent there was an imbalance between 60-month and 36-month loans in one of the LCA funds as compared to its initial target, the specific 36/60-month balance was disclosed to investors every month.

2. Any manual adjustments used by the LCA team as part of the funds valuation methodology had a total net impact of 0.08% of the funds value over 5 years, and I strongly believe those adjustments were made by the LCA team in good faith.

In any event, I am glad that we can now put these issues behind us and focus on the important goals of making credit more affordable to consumers and delivering attractive returns to investors through disciplined underwriting and exciting product innovation.  With the benefit of my prior experience, I feel better equipped to establish a strong culture of compliance and effective internal controls under the supervision of capable professionals.”

LendingClub, the actual company, or LendingClub Corporation, was spared any charges from the SEC because of its cooperation with the agency. The SEC press release explains below:

“The SEC’s Enforcement Division determined not to recommend charges against LendingClub Corporation, which promptly self-reported its executives’ misconduct following a review initiated by its board of directors, thoroughly remediated, and provided extraordinary cooperation with the agency’s investigation.  LCA also reimbursed approximately $1 million to investors who were adversely impacted by the improperly adjusted monthly returns.”

Lending Club, which Laplanche brought public 2014, did not respond in time to questions before publication.

War on Debt Settlement Continues: 16 Defendants Sued in RICO Case

September 6, 2018
Article by:

war

Fourteen individuals and two companies (including Decision One Debt Relief) were sued by Funding Metrics in Federal court last month for allegedly “conducting a nationwide illegal debt restructuring scheme through numerous acts of mail and wire fraud.”

The suit, which stems from the defendants’ interference with Funding Metrics’ merchant cash advance customers, makes six claims, among them financial damages resulting from state and federal crimes. Per the complaint:

“Defendant Decision One (along with its affiliate/alter ego D1 Servicing) fraudulently presents itself as being able to renegotiate and restructure merchant agreements with Plaintiff and other funding companies. It has established a deceptive business practice of making misleading and often outright false representations to merchants under contract with Plaintiff promising that, with its help, these merchants will save money on those contracts by defaulting on them. Decision One tells merchants that they can safely stop paying cash advance funding companies like Plaintiff; that it will go to work for them promptly; that it can reduce their debt by 60-80% or more; and that they will be provided with a Veritas insurance plan to cover legal expenses arising from their defaults, once cash advance companies exercise their rights under agreements with their merchants, as they inevitably will. Based on these misrepresentations, the merchants default on their contracts with their funders – that is, at Decision One’s direction, they stop paying their funders and instead pay Decision One – although Decision One does not even expect to achieve results for the merchants. The result is a fraud on the merchants and tortious interference with the contracts Plaintiff have with them.”

The suit is just the latest bomb dropped on the exploding debt settlement industry. deBanked began covering the controversy surrounding debt settlement in late 2016 after the owner and employees of an upstate New York debt settlement company were arrested for charging merchants to restructure their merchant cash advances and then not actually performing any services. The owner, Sergiy Bezrukov, was charged with money laundering, bank fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud. Bezrukov has been locked away in jail for almost two years awaiting trial. He is facing a maximum of 30 years. Two of his employees pled guilty, Vanessa Cardona to bank fraud and Dustin Walker to conspiracy to commit bank fraud.

Since then, nearly a dozen major lawsuits have been filed by merchant cash advance companies against other debt settlement companies that are alleged to be carrying out similar schemes. One of those sued companies, NJ-based Corporate Bailout LLC, was featured on the cover of the New York Post last summer for being “the craziest office in America.” Corporate Bailout was sued by both Yellowstone Capital and Everest Business Funding which later resulted in a very public settlement agreement that forced Corporate Bailout to fork over $500,000 to the two MCA companies.

Decision One Debt Relief, sued now by Funding Metrics, was also originally a co-defendant alongside MCA Helpline in a lawsuit filed by Everest Business Funding earlier this year. In February, after determining the two were not related, Everest dropped the claims against Decision One only. The suit against MCA Helpline is still pending.

Around that same time, a representative for Decision One revealed to deBanked that the company was on track to be doing more than $100 million a year in business.

Bezrukov, by contrast, who currently resides in a Niagara County New York jail, is accused of having only obtained $1.2 million throughout his entire debt settlement venture’s existence. Although Decision One is not being charged criminally, the private civil suit alleges damages caused by a violation of criminal statutes including RICO.

The Funding Metrics suit against Decision One was filed in the Southern District of Florida under ID# 9:18-cv-81061.

READ MORE DEBT SETTLEMENT CASE BRIEFS AND STORIES HERE

Decision One Complaint