Legal Briefs
Embezzler Used Funds to Pay Lending Club Loan
August 14, 2016Brian T. Cisek pled guilty last week to charges of embezzlement and theft of union funds. A postal worker employee and chairman of the Muscular Dystrophy Association Charity Committee operated through the postal union, Cisek embezzled approximately $9,000 from the charity between January 2013 and September 2014.
According to the plea agreement, Cisek at one point duped the union into giving him a $500 advance to pay for various setup costs of the charity’s upcoming golf outing. But once he received the funds, he used them to make an overdue loan payment to Lending Club.
The statutory maximum sentence that the court can impose for his crime is 5 years imprisonment, 3 years supervised release and a fine of $10,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense.
The case number is 1:16-cr-00149-RJJ in the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division in the United States District Court.
Madden v Midland Won’t Be Heard By The US Supreme Court
June 27, 2016
The US Supreme Court has decided not to hear the case of Saliha Madden v Midland Funding.
This was to be expected after US Solicitor General Donald Verrilli filed a devastating brief last month on behalf of the United States government that argued the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was incorrect in its ruling. There is “no circuit split on the question presented,” he wrote, and “the parties did not present key aspects of the preemption analysis” to the lower courts.
Vincent Basulto, a partner at Richards Kibbe & Orbe LLP in New York, said “While it is not expected that other circuits will adopt the reasoning of the Second Circuit, in part due to the arguments made by the Solicitor General, the appellate decision stands as good law in NY. The case will return to the district court for further consideration of other issues and there is reason to believe that the outcome there may be favorable for the financial services industry due to a choice of law issue which remains to be decided.”
US Solicitor General Verrilli resigned three days before the Supreme Court’s decision, but his brief on the case will likely be cited for years to come.
“For the foreseeable future,” Basulto added, “parties can be expected to structure their arrangements in an attempt to distinguish the Madden decision from their transaction, though it is not clear how best to do that.”
Merchant Cash Advance Definitely NOT a Loan, New York Judge Rules
June 11, 2016
A New York Supreme Court Justice ruled that a purchase of future receivables is not a loan. And it’s not even close, according to a decision and order by The Honorable Jerome C. Murphy in Platinum Rapid Funding Group Ltd v. VIP Limousine Services, Inc. and Charles Cotton.
As a background, the corporate defendant agreed to sell their future receivables to plaintiff in return for an upfront payment, an arrangement commonly referred to as a merchant cash advance. Defendants breached and plaintiff filed a lawsuit accordingly. Defendants asserted twelve defenses including that plaintiff had committed civil and criminal usury. Plaintiff Platinum Rapid Funding Group then moved to dismiss their defenses.
In a 9-page decision, Justice Murphy dismissed nearly all of the defenses, including the one alleging usury, because as he put it, the agreement was not a loan, so there can be no usury. His ruling on that defense is quoted below:
Defendants’ contention that the Agreements violate General Obligation § Law 5-501[1] and Banking Law § 14-a[1], and are civilly and criminally usurious is without merit. A corporation is prohibited from asserting a defense of civil usury (Arbozova v. Skalet, 92 A.D.3d 816 [2d Dept. 2012]). An individual guarantor of a corporate obligation is also precluded from raising such a defense (Id.). Defendants have failed to adequately allege a defense of criminal usury in violation of Penal Law § 190.40, in that they failed to allege that the lender knowingly charged, took or received annual interest exceeding 25% on a loan or forbearance of money. In its bill of particulars, defendant hypothesizes that the terms of the Agreement could result in the payment of criminally excessive interest, but this is clearly insufficient under the pleading requirements.
Essentially, usury laws are applicable only to loans or forbearances, and if the transaction is not a loan, there can be no usury. As onerous as a repayment requirement may be, it is not usurious if it does not constitute a loan or forbearance. The Agreement was for the purchase of future receivables in return for an upfront payment. The repayment was based upon a percentage of daily receipts, and the period over which such payment would take place was indeterminate. Plaintiff took the risk that there could be no daily receipts, and defendants took the risk that, if receipts were substantially greater than anticipated, repayment of the obligation could occur over an abbreviated period, with the sum over and above the amount advanced being more than 25%. The request for the Court to convert the Agreement to a loan, with interest in excess of 25%, would require unwarranted speculation, and would contradict the explicit terms of the sale of future receivables in accordance with the Merchant Agreement.
The detailed explanation reaffirms the obvious distinctions that such a purchase has from a loan, even when such receivables purchased are future receivables. To the extent that defendants argued that a potential outcome of such an agreement could hypothetically be converted to a usurious interest rate, that is a risk that the defendants took, the Court said, and converting this sale agreement to a loan would require “unwarranted speculation.”
Christopher Murray of Giuliano McDonnell & Perrone, LLP is the attorney representing plaintiff Platinum Rapid Funding Group in this action. The case number is 604163/2015 in the New York Supreme Court.
WebBank Alleged to be “Sham Pass Through Bank” in New Lending Club Usury Class Action
April 15, 2016
A new class action lawsuit filed on April 6th alleges that Lending Club and WebBank among others, violated state usury laws, consumer protection laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).
Plaintiff Ronald Bethune, a New York resident, is arguing that his 29.97% APR loan through Lending Club violated the state’s 16% interest cap.
While the Second Circuit’s ruling in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC is cited, the complaint focuses more on WebBank’s role in carrying out a collaborative fraud scheme.
Defendants associated together for the common purpose of limiting costs, eliminating oversight, and maximizing each members’ profits by engaging in the fraudulent conduct described herein. Specifically, the members of the Enterprise enticed tens of thousands of consumers to sign up for loans through LCC [LendingClub Corporation], hoping that enough consumers would select LCC for their loans without the fact that WebBank was a “pass through” sham party to the transaction being brought to light making the loans illegal and usurious. The purpose was to allow Defendants to charge, and profit from, usurious interest rates to Plaintiff and members of the Class, and to do so without regulatory oversight.
The plaintiff acknowledges that Lending Club recently adjusted its relationship with WebBank and the class seeks to recover damages for all loans made prior.
WebBank’s parent company, Steel Partners Holdings LP, who is also named as a co-defendant, has barely registered any movement in its stock price.
Lending Club by contrast, is down almost 10% since the complaint was filed.
YOU CAN DOWNLOAD THE FULL CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT HERE
This case is unrelated to another pending class action against Lending Club.
Plot Twist: Obama Administration to Comment on Madden v Midland
March 22, 2016
The U.S. Supreme Court wants to know what the Obama administration thinks of the Madden v Midland case.
The potential impact of Madden v Midland on marketplace lending was finally starting to fade away until the U.S. Supreme Court made an unexpected move yesterday. “The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States,” the docket states. At issue is the scope of preemption under the National Bank Act (i.e. can you buy a loan issued by a nationally chartered bank that legally circumvented state usury laws at the time it was originated and still enforce the interest rate?)
The Solicitor General is responsible for arguing cases on behalf of the U.S. government in the U.S. Supreme Court. The position is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. That seat is currently filled by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., an Obama appointee and the man credited with saving Obamacare. He was the attorney that helped persuade the Supreme Court to treat the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as a tax and not as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
Any brief filed is bound to become politically significant since the Obama Administration is on its way out. Therefore any views it expresses in the next few months may not be the same views of the next administration scheduled to be sworn in ten months from now.
Madden v Midland will have no bearing on merchant cash advances and little if any bearing on commercial marketplace lenders. That’s because most not only work with state chartered banks instead of nationally chartered banks, but also face more favorable state usury laws since they do not lend to consumers.
Ohio Considers Regulation of Confessions of Judgment
March 20, 2016
In a commercial lending context, courts and legislatures have generally assumed that the parties to the agreement have relatively equal bargaining power. Because of this understanding – that a business borrower is more sophisticated than a consumer borrower – regulation has been more “hands off” with regard to the terms commercial loans may contain. One such clause frequently found in commercial loan agreements is a confession of judgment clause, also called a cognovit judgment. A confession of judgment is written authorization by the borrower directing the entry of a judgment against him in the event he defaults on payment. A confession of judgment clause in a loan agreement permits the creditor on default to appear in court and confer judgment against the borrower.
Interestingly, Ohio is now considering legislation to regulate the use of the confession of judgment in a commercial loan agreement. House Bill 291 would require attorneys for creditors to include in a petition for confession of judgment the borrower’s last known address so that the borrower can be advised of the creditor’s decision to execute on the confession of judgment. Such notice gives the borrower the opportunity to dispute the execution on the confession of judgment clause. It would further provide that a confession of judgment be made “only for nonpayment of principal and interest under the terms of an instrument evidencing indebtedness,” which would eliminate the ability to obtain other damages. It also bans the use of the clause for something other than a nonmonetary default, which some Ohio courts have allowed. For example, in Fifth Third Bank v. Pezzo Construction, an Ohio appellate court allowed execution on a confession of judgment where the borrower failed to pay all taxes when due as required by the loan agreement. Another court rejected such use of confessions of judgment in Henry County Bank v. Stimmels, Inc. House Bill 291, if adopted, would make clear that only payment defaults can result on a confession of judgment.
House Bill 291 is not yet scheduled for a hearing.
Lending Club Class Action Lawsuit Predicated on Madden v Midland Risk
March 2, 2016UPDATE: This case is unrelated to another class action filed against Lending Club on April 6th
Lending Club is the latest publicly traded online lender to get hit by a shareholder class action lawsuit (OnDeck was first). Filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Lending Club misleadingly concealed the fact that:
- Lending Club had an unsustainable business model that was predicated on it being able to issue loans with extremely high and/or usurious rates across the country
- that their loan investors would not be able to enforce the extremely high and/or usurious rates imposed by Lending Club because they violated state usury laws
- that without the extremely high and/or usurious rates, the loans generated through Lending Club’s marketplace would not be attractive to investors because the loans had very high credit risk and were subject to issues concerning insufficient documentation
- that a substantial portion of its loans were issued with rates in excess of those allowed by applicable state usury laws
The action seeks “recovery, including rescission, for innocent purchasers who suffered many millions of dollars in losses when the truth about Lending Club emerged and the its stock price plummeted.”
Among the Defendants is former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers.
The complaint alleges that the truth about Lending Club began to emerge after “the Second Circuit affirmed [in Madden v Midland] that the business model used by Lending Club was not valid because loans sold by banks to non-banks, third parties (such as Lending Club and its investors) are not exempt from state usury laws that limit interest rates.”
–In actuality, no such affirmation was made. Lending Club does not specifically use Midland Funding’s business model and the case was not about Lending Club, nor was Lending Club mentioned in it.
“Specifically, the Second Circuit observed that assignees and third-party debt buyers could not rely on the National Bank Act to export interest rates that were legal in one state but usurious in another, to the states where those rates were impermissible,” the complaint states.
–Perhaps, but Lending Club’s bank makes loans under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, not the National Bank Act.
As supporting evidence, the complaint cites statements from Moody’s analysts, Morgan Stanley, Cross River Bank CEO Gilles Gade, and Lending Club CEO Renaud Laplanche himself in a quarterly earnings call.
While the impact of Madden v Midland has been seriously overblown, Lending Club’s stock has no doubt taken a beating since its IPO. The complaint states a loss of 43% from the original offering price. Among the defendants are:
- LendingClub Corporation
- Renaud Laplanche
- Carrie Dolan
- Daniel Ciporin
- Jeffrey Crowe
- Rebecca Lynn
- John J. Mack
- Mary Meeker
- John C. (Hans) Morris
- Lawrence Summers
- Simon Williams
- Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
- Goldman, Sachs & Co.
- Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
- Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
- Allen & Company LLC
- Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated
- BMO Capital markets Corp.
- William Blair & Company, L.L.C.
- Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
NOTE: This case is unrelated to another class action filed against Lending Club on April 6th
Federal Usury Caps Unlikely After CFPB Statements
February 15, 2016
Business lenders and merchant cash advance companies can breathe a little earlier since David Silberman, the CFPB’s acting deputy director, said at a House hearing that federal usury caps were off the table for the nation’s most controversial form of lending, payday loans. “We will not establish a usury cap and interest-rate limits on these or any other lending product,” Silberman said. “We have not contemplated doing so and we will not do so.”
This should quell speculation that CFPB involvement or regulatory activity in other areas of lending, will eventually include interest rate caps at the federal level. The Dodd-Frank act actually bars the CFPB from setting rate caps but that hasn’t stopped lenders from thinking it might still happen otherwise.
Two years ago, Barney Frank, a co-sponsor of the Dodd-Frank act, said on the record that he himself was against federal interest rate caps when asked if they should exist in business lending.
Meanwhile, presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has proposed a nationwide usury cap of 15% APR. How exactly he would make that a reality, especially since it is unlikely to gain congressional popularity, is uncertain.
