00:04.980 --> 00:08.370 Sean Murray: Today we are going to talk about securitizations. 00:08.520 --> 00:14.760 So I'm here with Gunes Kulaligil who is here from Methodical 00:14.760 --> 00:17.790 Management. Can you tell me what your company does? 00:18.650 --> 00:21.710 Gunes Kulaligil: Sure, we provide valuation and advisory 00:21.710 --> 00:25.100 services to our clients for illiquid, esoteric and hard to 00:25.100 --> 00:28.880 value assets. There's a big world of illiquid assets out 00:28.880 --> 00:32.270 there. We specialize in structured products. For us, 00:32.270 --> 00:36.560 that means secured and unsecured consumer and business loans, 00:36.770 --> 00:40.160 securitizations that use these assets as collateral and 00:40.160 --> 00:44.450 servicing rights on these these types of assets. The clients we 00:44.450 --> 00:48.260 serve will obviously include originators of these assets, who 00:48.260 --> 00:53.180 may retain whole long portfolios, servicers who have 00:53.570 --> 00:56.630 mortgage servicing rights or other types of servicing rights 00:56.660 --> 00:59.840 that add value to it. And obviously, investors who are 00:59.840 --> 01:02.630 active in the space, whether they're investing in senior or 01:02.630 --> 01:05.150 subordinate securities, you know, whether they're insurance 01:05.150 --> 01:10.160 companies or hedge funds, they will need this type of valuation 01:10.160 --> 01:13.340 work, both for financial reporting purposes. And really 01:13.340 --> 01:15.920 also in the context of transactions when they're buying 01:15.920 --> 01:20.420 or selling assets or, you know, structuring facilities to to 01:20.420 --> 01:24.710 fund these types of these types of assets. From an accounting 01:24.710 --> 01:27.860 perspective, everything that we're going to discuss today, 01:28.010 --> 01:32.930 whether it's an MCA portfolio, or securitization is going to be 01:32.930 --> 01:37.820 a level three asset. All level three means is it's an illiquid 01:37.820 --> 01:41.360 asset. By the way, there is no level four, and you need to rely 01:41.360 --> 01:45.050 on on observable market inputs, you need to build a model where 01:45.050 --> 01:47.960 you project the cash flows use a discount rate to calculate an 01:47.960 --> 01:51.890 NPV, as opposed to a level one asset. An example would be a 01:51.890 --> 01:55.430 treasury bond or a corporate bond, or a trade, trade equity 01:55.430 --> 01:58.550 where you can look up the last trade and that's, that's what 01:58.550 --> 02:00.950 the value is, right? So you really don't need to build a 02:00.950 --> 02:03.530 model or anything like that Right in the middle are level 02:03.530 --> 02:06.800 two assets, some type of corporate bonds or munis, will 02:06.800 --> 02:09.950 fall into this criteria, they're not as complicated as level 02:09.950 --> 02:14.570 three assets or they're not as illiquid as level three assets 02:14.570 --> 02:18.590 yet also, obviously, not as liquid as level one. And they're 02:18.590 --> 02:21.560 not as complex. So you can look look at other assets to figure 02:21.560 --> 02:27.110 out their values. For what we do, there's a lot more credit 02:27.110 --> 02:31.250 work, a lot more financial analytics that goes into it, and 02:31.250 --> 02:34.850 being able to understand what's going on in other markets that 02:34.850 --> 02:38.030 where you can triangulate some of these unobservable inputs, 02:38.150 --> 02:42.560 whether that's your projections were pre payments or defaults, 02:42.710 --> 02:47.780 or the discount rate that you're going to use to, to discount 02:47.780 --> 02:51.590 these assets to today to calculate the NPV that's going 02:51.590 --> 02:55.970 to be used when these funds are cutting their NAVs for for 02:56.000 --> 03:00.500 quarter or year. Right. So these are important numbers that get 03:00.500 --> 03:04.460 used when investors are getting in and out of out of these, 03:04.580 --> 03:10.070 these funds. And therefore, you know, we help asset managers and 03:10.280 --> 03:14.030 investors determine the fair value of their portfolios. 03:14.060 --> 03:16.070 Sean Murray: Perfect. Well, it sounds like you're the person I 03:16.070 --> 03:18.380 need to be talking to, because I had questions about 03:18.380 --> 03:23.300 securitizations. Securitizations have come up in the news over 03:23.300 --> 03:26.840 the last few months, a lot of times with alternative lenders. 03:27.050 --> 03:30.590 And I think what everyone wants to know is, what's the state of 03:30.740 --> 03:33.350 the securitization market right now, because it's my 03:33.350 --> 03:36.440 understanding that securitizations provide a very 03:36.440 --> 03:39.740 significant source of funding to not just alternative lenders, 03:39.740 --> 03:41.720 but to all lenders in general, is that right? 03:42.260 --> 03:44.870 Gunes Kulaligil: Securitization is the process of creating 03:45.140 --> 03:49.550 investable securities, with different risk return profiles, 03:49.820 --> 03:54.560 using pool of assets, cash flowing assets as collateral. 03:55.370 --> 03:58.670 That's really all there is to it at the end of the day. It's 03:58.670 --> 04:02.180 really a big and complicated market. And I think it's really 04:02.180 --> 04:05.240 important to kind of understand the components of it, as it has 04:05.240 --> 04:08.210 ramifications for really all types of lending in the United 04:08.210 --> 04:12.650 States, whether that's consumer lending or mortgage lending. So 04:12.650 --> 04:15.740 let's talk about what type of assets actually make good 04:15.740 --> 04:18.860 collateral for securitizations. At the end of the day we're 04:18.860 --> 04:23.420 looking for assets that make periodic recurring principal or 04:23.420 --> 04:26.720 interest payments, and we're looking for assets that are not 04:26.840 --> 04:29.840 too short term, right. So we're not looking for assets that 04:29.840 --> 04:33.830 prepay in three months or five months. We're looking for assets 04:33.830 --> 04:36.710 that hopefully will be around for the next few years, right. 04:36.710 --> 04:40.130 In the case of, for example, mortgages in the United States, 04:40.130 --> 04:44.000 clearly a huge securitization market. There's about 11 04:44.030 --> 04:48.170 trillion of mortgage debt outstanding. 9 trillion of that 04:48.170 --> 04:51.200 is securitized just to kind of give you an idea about the size 04:51.200 --> 04:54.560 of the market, right? The reason that many mortgages are 04:54.560 --> 04:58.550 securitized is obviously 30 year fixed rate mortgages in the 04:58.550 --> 05:03.080 United States. They pay monthly principal interest payments. I'd 05:03.080 --> 05:06.710 said deep enough market obviously, and there's so much 05:06.710 --> 05:09.710 history to be able to analyze it. But mortgages are not the 05:09.710 --> 05:13.400 only assets that do get securitized. Student loans, 05:13.400 --> 05:18.440 consumer loans, or marketplace lending loans are the different 05:18.440 --> 05:21.290 types of assets that get that gets securitized on the 05:21.290 --> 05:26.690 mainstream type side of things. Other esoteric type assets also 05:26.690 --> 05:31.970 do get securitized, for example, billboard revenues, right? 05:32.090 --> 05:35.900 There's about 160,000 miles of highways in the United States. I 05:35.900 --> 05:38.030 just looked it up the other day. So there's thousands of 05:38.030 --> 05:41.390 billboards, somebody is earning some revenues on that, that do 05:41.390 --> 05:45.200 get securitized. Music royalties, right then when you 05:45.200 --> 05:48.860 listen to your favorite song next time, just think that your 05:48.890 --> 05:52.910 artist may have monetized the, the royalty on those, on those 05:52.910 --> 05:56.570 songs. So it's a big and complicated market. But at the 05:56.570 --> 06:01.760 end of the day, these are the types of assets that serve as 06:01.760 --> 06:05.450 good collateral for, for securitizations. And we said 06:05.450 --> 06:08.000 we're looking for a pool of assets, right. So in the case 06:08.000 --> 06:14.330 of, for example, $100,000 small business loan or a $300,000 06:14.360 --> 06:20.810 mortgage is not a investable, is not an investable security and 06:20.810 --> 06:24.200 it's really not predictable when it comes to the default or the 06:24.200 --> 06:28.280 prepayment behavior. But when you pool hundreds or thousands 06:28.280 --> 06:32.240 of these assets, you now have a you know, 100 million dollar 06:32.240 --> 06:35.480 pool where you can go ahead and actually issue some bonds on 06:35.480 --> 06:39.650 them right. So now with our pool of cash flowing assets, we're 06:39.650 --> 06:43.490 going to create some investable securities out of that. In order 06:43.490 --> 06:45.500 to do that, we need to understand the types of 06:45.500 --> 06:49.460 investors that are active in the securitization market. Deep 06:49.460 --> 06:51.800 enough market obviously, there are many different types of 06:51.800 --> 06:55.190 investors interactive, but for the purposes of this discussion, 06:55.190 --> 06:58.970 let's just say there's an insurance company, obviously 06:58.970 --> 07:02.960 risk averse and then there's a hedge fund with a bigger risk 07:02.960 --> 07:07.010 appetite and wishing for higher yield, right. So when we're 07:07.010 --> 07:10.010 thinking about investable securities, we want to be able 07:10.010 --> 07:13.310 to appeal to both of these investors, because without the 07:13.310 --> 07:15.920 insurance company buying the seniors and the hedge fund 07:15.920 --> 07:20.030 buying the subordinated bonds, the securitization doesn't get 07:20.030 --> 07:25.040 done. So the goal of then the process of securitization is to 07:25.160 --> 07:29.240 take these cash flows from the pool of, pool of assets that we 07:29.240 --> 07:33.230 securitize and slice it dice it in a way that you can create a 07:33.230 --> 07:36.860 senior security whether it's rated or whether it is it has a 07:36.860 --> 07:40.640 certain term that is appealing to the investor, to the 07:40.640 --> 07:45.200 insurance company. Right. And it obviously insurance companies 07:45.230 --> 07:48.260 look for some credit protection. So therefore we have a 07:48.260 --> 07:51.500 subordinated bond that is buffered from losses to protect 07:51.500 --> 07:55.760 the senior bond right in case the cash flows from the pool is 07:55.760 --> 07:58.190 not enough, which we're going to talk about in a few minutes. 07:59.000 --> 08:03.830 Under all that is the bottom piece, which is the residual, 08:03.830 --> 08:06.650 the equity piece over-collateralization, whatever 08:06.650 --> 08:10.310 you want to call it, that is essentially the skin in the game 08:10.880 --> 08:15.170 of the originator. That is the definitely the first last piece 08:15.170 --> 08:17.570 on everything. So if there's any shortfalls principle write 08:17.570 --> 08:20.840 downs, or any kind of losses being generated from the 08:20.840 --> 08:24.500 collateral pool will hit that bottom piece first. So that 08:24.500 --> 08:27.290 essentially skin in the game creates incentive for the 08:27.470 --> 08:31.040 originator to really make good loans in the first place. If 08:31.040 --> 08:34.250 not, obviously during the first loss position, they will take 08:34.370 --> 08:39.140 losses as well. So that in essence is what securitization 08:39.140 --> 08:43.220 is and what it does, at the end of the day, why go through this 08:43.220 --> 08:46.880 trouble? Because you know, it is complicated. It's not easy or 08:46.880 --> 08:49.850 cheap to do these securitizations. Yet, if you 08:49.850 --> 08:53.000 look at it from the originators perspective, if you're able to 08:53.000 --> 08:57.050 access the securitization markets, you now have access to 08:57.050 --> 09:00.260 a longer term and potential lower cost of funds and you can 09:00.260 --> 09:03.410 originate more business. From the investor's perspective, as 09:03.410 --> 09:07.580 we talked about, you can access securities that are tailored to 09:07.580 --> 09:12.380 your risk return expectations. And from the, you know, 09:12.410 --> 09:15.920 borrower's perspective, or from the consumer's perspective, the 09:15.920 --> 09:19.670 involvement of these larger financial institutions, brings 09:19.670 --> 09:24.230 more liquidity to the market, which makes credit and lending 09:24.230 --> 09:26.270 more available and accessible. 09:27.260 --> 09:30.080 Sean Murray: So it's amazing how many things can be securitized, 09:30.350 --> 09:33.650 so my question would be can you give us a quick refresher on 09:33.650 --> 09:35.270 securitization structures then? 09:35.300 --> 09:37.850 Gunes Kulaligil: When we talked about what makes a good 09:37.850 --> 09:43.310 securitization asset, we said it needs to be a recurring cash 09:43.310 --> 09:45.770 flows and it needs to have a longer term. You don't want to 09:45.770 --> 09:50.510 necessarily be securitizing a three months consumer loan for 09:50.510 --> 09:57.140 example, that or a three month MCA on its own, that prepays in 09:57.140 --> 10:00.860 three months and you know, there's really not enough 10:00.860 --> 10:03.950 collateral to make the securitization worth it right? 10:04.430 --> 10:08.330 Not enough collateral sticks around. So in order to deal with 10:08.330 --> 10:14.030 this issue in a securitization is use a revolving structure, 10:14.210 --> 10:19.430 really all it is, is after the securitization is issued, both 10:19.460 --> 10:23.720 the senior and subordinated bond, neither of them get 10:23.720 --> 10:27.920 principal for a period of maybe one to three years, in which 10:27.920 --> 10:31.160 time the cash flows generated from the asset pool are 10:31.160 --> 10:35.390 reinvested back into the asset pool. In essence, originator is 10:35.390 --> 10:38.690 making new loans are new advances and then putting it 10:38.720 --> 10:42.140 back, back into the collateral pool. This is a very important 10:42.140 --> 10:46.010 feature and kind of brings up the question is the 10:46.010 --> 10:50.030 securitization really bankruptcy remote or, you know, forget the 10:50.030 --> 10:52.550 legal side of things, but what is the exposure of the 10:52.550 --> 10:55.910 securitization to the performance of the of the 10:55.910 --> 11:00.380 originator, so it brings up a lot of questions and, and it's 11:00.380 --> 11:04.340 actually related to the rapid amortization events that we've 11:04.340 --> 11:07.790 seen in the last in the last few months, so let's talk about that 11:07.790 --> 11:12.890 a little bit. In normal times, if all goes to plan, and all of 11:12.890 --> 11:16.100 this, by the way, is explained in the lovely 300 page 11:16.130 --> 11:19.280 prospectus document that comes with a supplement in a pooling 11:19.280 --> 11:22.370 and servicing agreement, but really what happens inside of 11:22.370 --> 11:27.470 securitization is if everything is fine, after this revolving 11:27.470 --> 11:32.660 periods, first your senior bond may be, it may be paid down then 11:32.660 --> 11:36.110 your subordinate and then to whatever is left is released to 11:36.110 --> 11:40.040 the equity. But these prospectuses are filled with a 11:40.160 --> 11:45.080 bunch of if-else statements. So we're in that else area where 11:45.230 --> 11:49.670 things haven't really gone to plan, gone, gone as planned, we 11:49.670 --> 11:54.050 have seen payment percentages come down, delinquencies go up. 11:54.350 --> 11:57.470 So this is all planned and written down, explained the 11:57.470 --> 12:01.220 prospectus as it says, at the time of origination issuance, 12:01.220 --> 12:05.480 it's agreed that if certain events happen, if certain rather 12:05.480 --> 12:08.810 limits reached wherever you're talking about your 30 day 12:08.810 --> 12:14.390 delinquencies, cumulative losses in the portfolio, or asset 12:14.390 --> 12:19.070 deficiency, certain events will take place. So what has happened 12:19.070 --> 12:24.710 last couple, couple months is the asset deficiency triggers 12:24.770 --> 12:28.070 have failed. All that means is when you do an MCA 12:28.070 --> 12:31.940 securitization, you may issue a you know, 50 million senior 30 12:31.940 --> 12:36.170 million sub eight million total, but you back that up with 120 12:36.170 --> 12:40.460 million of right to receive or outstanding balance, whatever 12:40.460 --> 12:45.050 you want to call it. So at the end of the day, you agreed then, 12:45.620 --> 12:48.620 throughout the revolving period, that there's going to be a 12:48.620 --> 12:51.170 certain amount of over-collateralization available 12:51.170 --> 12:54.680 for both the senior and the subordinated bonds. And if that 12:54.680 --> 13:00.110 doesn't happen, in you know, in the holding period, the rapid 13:00.110 --> 13:06.050 amortization then happens or takes place. All that means is 13:06.170 --> 13:10.400 there's no more reinvesting the cash flows from the collateral 13:10.400 --> 13:13.940 back into the pool, all the principal interest, whatever is 13:13.940 --> 13:17.210 coming from the pool in the case of MCAs, obviously, it's right 13:17.210 --> 13:21.380 to receive our monthly, weekly, the cash flows that- or daily 13:21.380 --> 13:24.530 cash flows that are coming in, all of that is directed to pay 13:24.530 --> 13:29.210 down the principal on, on the senior bonds. In a way the 13:29.210 --> 13:32.300 senior bond is happy, because you can see the collateral 13:32.300 --> 13:35.030 deteriorating and you don't necessarily want to see the 13:35.060 --> 13:38.630 losses eat up from the equity all the way to the subs and get 13:38.630 --> 13:41.660 closer to you because as a senior investor, you're not in 13:41.660 --> 13:44.300 the business of necessarily taking credit risk, right? So 13:44.420 --> 13:48.110 this protection is in place. So when the rapid amortization 13:48.110 --> 13:52.640 event happens, the senior bond pays down very quickly. And you 13:52.640 --> 13:55.820 know, in this, in these days, it's really not the worst thing 13:55.820 --> 13:58.670 but obviously not something you've planned for maybe you 13:58.730 --> 14:04.760 plan to earn this 4 or 5% coupon for three years. In the case of 14:04.760 --> 14:10.070 the subordinated bond, you're not happy. Well, it's hard to 14:10.070 --> 14:14.480 tell, right? Because it's all a function of how big are the 14:14.690 --> 14:17.780 losses you're gonna start eating from the equity and come closer 14:17.780 --> 14:22.400 to the subordinated bond. And keep in mind, you know, when we 14:22.400 --> 14:24.620 talk about the senior subordinated bonds, we're 14:24.620 --> 14:28.640 talking about coupons of 4% or 6%, that you paying for these 14:28.640 --> 14:31.580 bonds but the underlying collateral in the case of MCAs, 14:31.760 --> 14:35.960 it's earning 50-60% APR is if you want to talk about it in APR 14:35.960 --> 14:39.080 equivalent terms. So there's a lot of excess interest in these 14:39.080 --> 14:43.010 deals that's actually helping to, you know, act as the 14:43.100 --> 14:47.900 ultimate first loss, if you will, to protect all the other 14:47.900 --> 14:52.250 tranches from, from losses. So there's really a lot going on 14:52.250 --> 14:56.930 here in the securitizations, but at the end of the day, you know 14:56.930 --> 15:00.470 these are happening because the collateral deteriorated faster 15:00.470 --> 15:04.700 than expected. And it does bring up some questions about Okay, 15:04.700 --> 15:08.330 what what to expect next? And what else to watch out for? 15:08.990 --> 15:12.320 Sean Murray: So we've had some triggers hit recently. So my 15:12.320 --> 15:15.350 question would be, you know, what's going to happen next, are 15:15.350 --> 15:17.990 securitization is going to become less common in 15:17.990 --> 15:21.800 alternative lending. What should we be looking out for here with 15:21.800 --> 15:22.900 them? 15:22.990 --> 15:25.120 Gunes Kulaligil: Right. So what does all this mean, at the end 15:25.120 --> 15:29.230 of the day, from the perspective of the originator, investor, 15:29.920 --> 15:32.590 servicer, or many other participants in the 15:32.590 --> 15:34.930 securitization sector? So yeah, let's talk about that a little 15:34.930 --> 15:39.400 bit. From the originators, originators perspective, the 15:39.400 --> 15:45.490 reason the rapid amortization event is taking place, the 15:45.490 --> 15:48.520 reason asset deficiency has happened is because the 15:48.520 --> 15:52.180 originator hasn't been able to, or hasn't been willing to 15:52.240 --> 15:55.870 originate new loans or new advances. Because in the 15:55.870 --> 16:00.100 revolving period, if the originator was able to add new 16:00.190 --> 16:04.090 advances to the pools, some of those triggers wouldn't have 16:04.090 --> 16:08.620 failed. Right? So, you know, what does this mean for, for the 16:08.620 --> 16:12.070 status of the originator not so great, right. And also, at the 16:12.070 --> 16:15.760 end of the day, from last, last couple of months during the 16:15.760 --> 16:18.700 lockdown? You know, the merchants weren't necessarily 16:18.700 --> 16:21.940 looking for small business loans or advances, right, there was 16:21.970 --> 16:26.350 all the PPP money, as well as the unemployment and all the 16:26.350 --> 16:29.950 stimulus that was going going through the system. So that's 16:29.950 --> 16:33.670 really from the perspective of the originator. Again, they may 16:33.670 --> 16:37.750 be unwilling or unable to make new loans unwilling part is, at 16:37.750 --> 16:41.230 the end of the day, they are in the product and in the business 16:41.230 --> 16:44.860 of making a spread from, you know, what they lend and what 16:44.860 --> 16:48.010 they borrow, right? So if that's present there, they may be, you 16:48.010 --> 16:51.850 know, unwilling to make loans. And, but they may shift their 16:51.850 --> 16:55.600 business model to different things. We've also seen a lot of 16:55.600 --> 17:00.610 these non bank lenders originate a good amount of PPP loans 17:00.910 --> 17:03.970 throughout throughout the pandemic. So, you know, that's 17:03.970 --> 17:07.060 the general status of the originator. If you think about 17:07.060 --> 17:11.950 the servicer, which is often a, you know, affiliated entity with 17:11.950 --> 17:16.120 the originator, they are doing a lot of modifications, you know, 17:16.330 --> 17:20.260 we are seeing delinquencies go up, payment percentages go down, 17:20.260 --> 17:22.810 I mentioned those, but they're also positives as well, 17:23.260 --> 17:26.680 servicers, originators, and the entire trust really has vested 17:26.680 --> 17:32.290 interest in, in these businesses coming back online and receiving 17:32.290 --> 17:35.740 revenues again, so that the trust can also get paid, right. 17:35.800 --> 17:38.200 So they have vested interest in that. And for that reason, 17:38.200 --> 17:43.420 they're modifying these loans, whether that means reducing the 17:43.450 --> 17:48.070 payment percentage, or extending the term or maybe reducing the 17:48.130 --> 17:50.800 amount that needs to be paid back. So there's all kinds of 17:50.800 --> 17:55.540 modifications. So servicers have vested interest in getting this 17:55.540 --> 18:01.060 done. Bond investors is we talked about, for the most part, 18:01.120 --> 18:05.110 seniors may get paid and get out of the way for the subordinate 18:05.110 --> 18:10.060 or some of the junior investors is to be seen case by case. And 18:10.060 --> 18:14.890 I certainly don't want to make any kind of huge generalization 18:14.890 --> 18:18.610 here and any more than I have. But all of these are all unique, 18:18.850 --> 18:22.570 it's a huge market, they all have different type of exposures 18:22.570 --> 18:26.200 to different geographical areas, different industries, you know, 18:26.200 --> 18:29.320 you may be Texas, California-heavy or you may have 18:29.350 --> 18:34.420 more exposure to trucking or leisure. Right. So some trusts 18:34.420 --> 18:38.230 will do better than others and that's true for merchant cash 18:38.230 --> 18:41.950 advances and same thing for really, for mortgages or, or 18:41.980 --> 18:47.110 really for any other any other collateral type. And, you know, 18:47.410 --> 18:51.700 so also from the perspective of the investor, you've seen all 18:51.700 --> 18:54.460 these things going on in this certain this asset class, you 18:54.460 --> 18:57.190 probably think twice when you're investing in this again, right? 18:57.190 --> 19:02.470 So it may take some time to make some new, you know, generate 19:02.470 --> 19:05.140 some new collateral and, you know, start doing some 19:05.230 --> 19:09.040 securitizations, especially for the MCA or small business type, 19:09.730 --> 19:12.550 type deals. On the other hand, though, we have seen 19:12.550 --> 19:15.970 securitization come back for many mainstream assets who are 19:15.970 --> 19:19.900 some of the ABS type assets whether that's mortgages, 19:19.930 --> 19:25.480 commercial real estate or some mortgage credit deals we have 19:25.480 --> 19:30.010 seen them get done in the last few months. There was only a few 19:30.010 --> 19:34.600 in April but I think in June over 40, 45 deals I believe 19:34.600 --> 19:37.210 we're done so you know things are things are starting to 19:37.210 --> 19:40.600 happen but I don't necessarily expect new origination new 19:40.600 --> 19:45.460 issuance will return to the MCA markets when it comes to the 19:45.460 --> 19:46.330 securitizations. 19:46.630 --> 19:49.420 Sean Murray: Well, I think you explained that very, very well. 19:49.450 --> 19:51.490 Thank you very much for answering my questions about 19:51.490 --> 19:52.270 that today. 19:53.440 --> 19:54.880 Gunes Kulaligil: Thank you, my pleasure Sean. 19:55.300 --> 19:57.940 Sean Murray: Okay, and that's all the time we have today. 19:58.360 --> 20:01.780 Again, that was Gunes Kulaligil with Methodical Management. 20:03.040 --> 20:03.400 Gunes Kulaligil: Thank you